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docs: map the threat model to STRIDE - #442

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hpmaxi merged 5 commits into
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docs/438-stride-threat-model
Nov 13, 2026
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hpmaxi merged 5 commits into
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docs/438-stride-threat-model

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@hpmaxi hpmaxi commented Nov 11, 2026

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Summary

Closes #438

The SCF Audit Bank asks for a STRIDE threat model with the application. docs/THREAT_MODEL.md lists its threats by area and never names STRIDE. Tampering, denial of service and elevation of privilege were well covered, spoofing only in part, and repudiation and information disclosure not at all. This change places every threat under its STRIDE categories and covers the three thin ones in full.

Changes

  • A table that places every threat under one or more STRIDE categories.
  • A section per category, with spoofing, repudiation and information disclosure covered in full.
  • R13: a shared /sign link shows its call, such as a freeze or a report's price, before the call lands.
  • R14: the identity verifier stub lists and delists addresses without publishing an event.
  • The README and the design doc's trust boundaries section say the threat model follows STRIDE.

Deviations

Acceptance criteria

  • A table maps every threat id (O1–O12, R1–R12, X1–X13) to one or more of Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege
  • Spoofing: states what proves who is calling (require_auth, role checks, one signature per account, the console's signing page) and links the threats that test it (R4, R12)
  • Repudiation: lists which privileged actions publish an event, names any that do not, and says what proves an action after the network drops its events (it keeps them for days only); links the monitoring plan's event collection
  • Information disclosure: says what is public on chain (positions, requests, allowlist entries, attestations and their proof references) and what stays off chain (the KYC data, the valuation's inputs), and that the first is public by design
  • Each category has at least one threat or an explicit "not applicable" with the reason
  • Anything the new sections find without a control becomes a threat in the same format (control, residual, test or "none and why"), or a follow-up issue
  • The README and the design doc §8.9 mention that the threat model follows STRIDE

Test plan

Automated tests

None: documentation only. A link check over the three changed files passes: every relative link and every anchor resolves, and the table has one row for each of the 39 threat headings.

Manual verification

  1. Open docs/THREAT_MODEL.md at the STRIDE section.
  2. Check that each threat id in the table links to its threat, and that every column has at least one mark.
  3. For the repudiation section, check that each privileged entrypoint in the kit spec's matrix publishes an event. You should find exactly one that changes state without one: allow on the identity verifier.
  4. Each test the new text cites exists under the name and file it gives.

Breaking changes

None.

Checklist

  • Self-reviewed my own diff
  • Tests added or updated
  • Docs updated (if applicable)
  • No unrelated changes bundled in

Screenshots

None.

Place every threat under its STRIDE categories and cover the three the
existing threats covered least. Repudiation lists which privileged calls
publish an event and what proves an act once the RPC drops it.
Information disclosure says what is public on chain and what stays off
it.

Two threats come out of it: a shared signing link shows its call before
it lands (R13), and the verifier stub lists and delists without an event
(R14). The scope moves to the commit the events were checked against.

Closes #438
@hpmaxi hpmaxi added documentation Improvements or additions to documentation priority: high epic:docs Runbook, README, contributing, release tranche-3 Grant Tranche 3 work labels Nov 11, 2026
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Project Deployment Actions Updated
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Request Review

Present the threat model in the shape the Audit Bank asks for: a data
flow diagram with its trust boundaries, numbered flows, issues for each
STRIDE category with their remediations, the Soroban checks and the
points the repository cannot confirm. Each issue points to the threat
that holds its control and tests instead of restating it.

Two risks had no threat of their own and get one: a call made in a
holder's name (X14) and the choice of which report prices an epoch
(O13).
Record what the self-service security tools found in the contracts and
how each finding was triaged. Scout is the tool of record: its version,
command and raw report are committed, and its 28 hits match an earlier
run on the tranche2 tag. Almanax, Certora Sunbeam and a check against
the Soroban Security Portal add their findings and proofs.

No critical, high or medium finding from the scanners is a new bug. The
plan covers the three open bugs the sweep found or confirmed.
@hpmaxi
hpmaxi requested a review from luchobonatti November 12, 2026 18:29

@luchobonatti luchobonatti left a comment

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LGTM. One optional suggestion inline.

Comment thread docs/THREAT_MODEL.md
recoveries; and the compliance contract's modules and bindings. Holders'
requests, cancellations and claims publish events too, and so do the calls
anyone may make. Three calls succeed without an event because they change
nothing: granting a role already held, a recovery from an empty balance, and

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With the kit's verifier recovery_target returns None, so recovery fails with IdentityMismatch before reaching the balance. Maybe scope this to a registry that names a recovery target?

docs: add the STRIDE template and the security scan
@hpmaxi
hpmaxi merged commit b55b79f into tranche-3 Nov 13, 2026
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@hpmaxi
hpmaxi deleted the docs/438-stride-threat-model branch November 13, 2026 15:33

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