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Submit the Audit Bank's application evidence: a STRIDE document in the template's format and a self-service scan with its remediation plan #443

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Description

@pragalli

Priority

High — the SCF Audit Bank asks for both pieces with the application, and Tranche 3 needs its audit

User story / Problem statement

The Audit Bank's participant eligibility says projects "must include a STRIDE threat model for the project as part of their application" and "must submit the results of one of the 'self-service tooling' options to include a list of all identified vulnerabilities and a remediation plan for fixing identified critical, high, and medium severity vulnerabilities prior to audit start". The readiness checklist adds a data flow diagram with trust boundaries and data entities, and says the panel reads nothing but the submission.

What the repo has at main (db90b95), and what #442 adds:

  • STRIDE. docs: map the threat model to STRIDE #442 maps the 39 threats of docs/THREAT_MODEL.md to STRIDE inside that file. It does not follow the shape of Stellar's STRIDE template (four headings, Spoof.N … Elevation.N ids, a remediation table, the five closing questions), and it adds no data flow diagram.
  • Self-service scan. None. CI runs cargo-deny (dependencies) and gitleaks (secrets), and neither reads the contracts' code. There is no list of findings and no remediation plan.

Expected outcome

Two documents under docs/, linked from the README, that a reviewer can read without opening anything else: the STRIDE threat model in the template's format, and the scan's findings with a remediation plan.

Acceptance criteria

A. STRIDE in the template's format

  • docs/STRIDE-threat-model.md has the template's four headings, the STRIDE reminders table as written, and answers the five closing questions
  • At least one Mermaid data flow diagram: actors, contracts, the off-chain parts (console, investor app, attester, keeper) and external contracts; every trust boundary a subgraph; every arrow numbered with its step and the call it carries
  • Numbered happy-path flows for deposit, request, epoch close, attest, fulfil, claim and a timelocked admin change, so a threat can cite a step
  • Each of S, T, R, I, D, E has at least one issue (Spoof.1, Tamper.1, …), each with its attacker, the step it targets and what it breaks
  • Each issue points to the O/R/X threat in docs/THREAT_MODEL.md that already treats it, instead of restating it; an issue with no threat there becomes a new threat or a follow-up issue
  • Each issue has at least one remediation (Spoof.1.R.1, …) marked In place (with the code or test), Recommended or Accepted (with the reason and the risk that remains)
  • The Soroban checks are each answered with a link or become an issue or an investigation point: overflow-checks in the release profile, upgrades through update_current_contract_wasm, __constructor and a second init, TTL and archival, require_auth on the right address
  • What cannot be confirmed from the repo is listed as investigation points (IP.N) in the last section
  • The README links the document

B. Self-service scan and remediation plan

  • The tool is one of those on Stellar's security tools page that reads code (Scout, Almanax or Certora Sunbeam; the Soroban Security Portal is a database of reports, not a scanner). The choice, the version, the command and the crates scanned are written down
  • It runs on every contract in scope (async-vault, share-token, nav-oracle, compliance, identity-verifier, and the shared crates they use); the raw report is committed
  • docs/SECURITY_SCAN.md lists every finding with its severity, its location and its triage: fixed, false positive (with why) or accepted (with why)
  • The remediation plan covers each critical, high and medium finding that stays open: the fix, who does it, the issue that tracks it and a date before the audit starts
  • Findings already fixed link their PR; open ones have an issue
  • The README links the document

Technical notes

  • Do the STRIDE part after docs: map the threat model to STRIDE #442 is merged: it builds on that mapping and must not contradict it.
  • Do not rewrite docs/THREAT_MODEL.md. The template document cites its ids.
  • The rules ask for one tool. A second one is a bonus, not a criterion.
  • The readiness checklist (updated a year ago) calls the scan optional; the rules (updated three months ago) require it, and the rules prevail. Treat it as required.
  • Out of scope: KYC, the co-payment, whether the multisig authorities count as code in the audit's scope, and filing the application.

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    documentationImprovements or additions to documentationepic:docsRunbook, README, contributing, releasepriority: hightranche-3Grant Tranche 3 work

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