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fix: reject certificates from the leaked emudhra intermediates - #2464
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The private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CAs leaked in October 2026 (write-up: https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/), and the roots they chain to are trusted by the major root programs. Farhelm checks HTTPS certificates against the operating system's certificate store and does not check revocation. On a Linux machine whose CA certificates package has not been updated yet (Debian had not shipped one at the time), the helm therefore accepts certificates issued with those keys, so whoever holds a key can pose as the servers the helm reaches over HTTPS. For the feedback endpoint that means reading or dropping what users send. Release downloads for adding or updating a host are still checked against a signed SHA256SUMS, so there an attacker can only block them, not alter them. This updates rustls-webpki, the library that does that certificate check on Linux, to 0.103.16, which refuses any chain containing the leaked keys whatever the trust store says (rustls/webpki#546). That closes the gap without waiting on distributions. macOS needs nothing: Farhelm uses Apple's verifier there, and Apple already blocks these intermediates.
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The private keys of eight eMudhra intermediate CAs leaked in October 2026
(write-up: https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/), and the roots they chain
to are trusted by the major root programs. Farhelm checks HTTPS certificates
against the operating system's certificate store and does not check
revocation. On a Linux machine whose CA certificates package has not been
updated yet (Debian had not shipped one at the time), the helm therefore
accepts certificates issued with those keys, so whoever holds a key can pose as
the servers the helm reaches over HTTPS. For the feedback endpoint that means
reading or dropping what users send. Release downloads for adding or updating
a host are still checked against a signed SHA256SUMS, so there an attacker can
only block them, not alter them.
This updates rustls-webpki, the library that does that certificate check on
Linux, to 0.103.16, which refuses any chain containing the leaked keys
whatever the trust store says (rustls/webpki#546). That closes the gap without
waiting on distributions. macOS needs nothing: Farhelm uses Apple's verifier
there, and Apple already blocks these intermediates.